

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SPC-01 L-02 NSC-10 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 EB-03 FEA-01

NEA-07 EA-13 ACDA-10 PRS-01 SAM-01 IO-03 OMB-01

TRSE-00 CEA-01 DRC-01 /094 W
----- 070275

R 151733Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8509

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0463

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR,ENRG, US, EEC, DA, NATO

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER GULDBERG TELLS AMBASSADOR

HOW HE REALLY FEELS ABOUT ENERGY CONFERENCE

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REF: COPENHAGEN 438, 448

SUMMARY: GULDBERG TREATED ME TODAY TO 30 MINUTE CRITIQUE OF WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE. MUCH OF HIS DISPLEASURE WAS DIRECTED AT FRG BECAUSE OF THEIR HANDLING OF FRENCH, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT USG COULD HAVE INFLUENCED GERMANS IN MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. ALTHOUGH HE TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE DISAGREED WITH FRENCH POSITION, HIS UNDERLYING SYMPATHY FOR FRENCH "LOGIQUE" WAS EVEN MORE CLEAR. HIS CHIEF CONCERN IS OVER DAMAGE DONE TO EC BY CLASH WITHIN NINE WHICH OCCURRED IN WASHINGTON. I WAS ABLE TO MAKE SOME POINTS IN REBUTTAL, PARTICULARLY ABOUT NECESSITY FOR CONSUMERS TO WORK TOGETHER TO REDUCE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITATION BY ARABPRODUCERS, AND HE WAS PERCEPTIBLY LESS AGITATED AT END OF OUR CONVERSATION. HE REMAINS BEARISH, HOWEVER, ABOUT LIKELIHOOD OF EFFECTIVE COOPERATION AMONG CONSUMERS AND VERY GLOOMY ABOUT IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. END SUMMARY.

1. AS SOON AS I ASKED GULDBERG HOW THE ENERGY CONFERENCE HAD GONE, HE REPLIED "BADLY", AND LAUNCHED INTO A LONG ACCOUNT OF HOW FOOLISH IT HAD BEEN TO ANTAGONIZE FRENCH UNNECESSARILY. ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE CONFERENCE HAD HAD BAD RESULTS, HE WAS NOT SAYING SO PUBLICLY. IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS EAGER TO GET SOMETHING OFF HIS CHEST BUT BY END OF OUR CONVERSATION HE APPEARED TO BE SOFTENING HIS CRITICISM OF THE CONFERENCE TO SOME EXTENT.

2. I COMMENTED THAT REPORTS I HAD SEEN FROM OTHER EC CAPITALS DID NOT SEEM AS NEGATIVE ON RESULTS OF CONFERENCE AS HE APPEARED TO BE, ALTHOUGH SOME IRRITATION WAS BEING EXPRESSED ABOUT FRANCE'S RIGID POSTURE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR BEFORE CONFERENCE EVEN BEGAN THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT AGREE TO FOLLOW-UP MEASURES. IN HIS VIEW, EC AGREEMENT TO OPPOSE FOLLOW-UP HAD BEEN A PRECONDITION FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION, AND NINE HAD ARRIVED WITH A COMMON MANDATE. THE OTHER EIGHT COULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE BOUND STRICTLY TO THE MANDATE DURING COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE AND HAD HOPED TO MOVE THE FRENCH TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE POSTURE IN WASHINGTON. THE CLASH WITHIN THE EC HAD BEEN UNNECESSARY IN HIS VIEW. GULDBERG ADDED THAT HE KNEW THE FRENCH MENTALITY WELL AND THAT CHANGING FRENCH POSITION COULD NEVER BE DONE THE WAY IT WAS ATTEMPTED BY FRG, APPARENTLY WITH US ENCOURAGEMENT. OPERATION WAS SO CLUMSY, HE SAID, HE IS TEMPTED TO

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BELIEVE SOMEONE MUST HAVE WANTED TO CONFERENCE TO FAIL.

3. GULDBERG SAID THAT OUT OF 15 POINTS ON AGENDA, AGREEMENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REACHED ON 14, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE PRO FORMA FRENCH RESERVATIONS ON SOME OF THEM. ON THE 15TH(FOLLOW-UP), HOWEVER, THERE WAS BOUND TO BE CONFLICT FROM THE START. HE ASCRIBED LARGE PART OF BLAME TO GERMANS, FOR MISHANDLING THEIR DUTIES IN PRESIDENCY OF EC. THEY APPARENTLY THOUGHT THEY COULD CHANGE

FRENCH POSITION BY PUBLIC PRESSURE. WHEN ASKED WHETHER EC WOULD LET FRENCH CALL TUNE FOR ENTIRE COMMUNITY, HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE POINT OF SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT AMONG 15 AGENDA ITEMS. ONE CAN TRY TO DEAL REALISTICALLY WITH A PROBLEM, HE SAID, OR YOU CAN MAKE IT INTO A DISASTER, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IN HIS MIND INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT HAD BEEN A DISASTER FOR THE EC.

4. TIMING OF CONFERENCE HAD ITSELF BEEN VERY UNFORTUNATE, GULDBERG SAID. UK WAS IN THROES OF ELECTION CRISIS AND EC HAD BEEN PLAGUED WITH DIFFICULTIES, NONE OF WHICH COULD BE HANDLED WHILE UK WAS SO OUT OF CONTROL. NOTHING IMPORTANT CAN BE DONE IN EC UNTIL AFTER FEBRUARY 28, WHEN UK VOTES, AND CLASH AMONG MEMBERS IN WASHINGTON MEANS THAT NOTHING WILL HAPPEN IN EC FOR AN EVEN LONGER TIME. ALL MEETINGS OF COUNCIL ARE BEING CANCELLED, HE STATED.

5. TIMING WAS ALSO UNFORTUNATE WITH REGARD TO ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION, GULDBERG SAID. MAKING PEACE IS MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IN MIDDLE EAST AND THAT IS WHAT YOU (U.S.) ARE TRYING TO DO. NEXT STEP IN PROCESS MIGHT HELPFULLY BE TO GIVE ARABS A CARD TO PLAY IN NEGOTIATIONS BOTH WITH ISRAELIS AND USSR. (ALTHOUGH HIS EXACT MEANING HERE WAS UNCLEAR, HE APPEARED TO HAVE IN MIND IDEA OF PERMITTING ARABS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR INDEPENDENCE OF USSR BECAUSE OF THEIR STRONG BARGAINING POSITION WITH WESTERN OIL CONSUMERS.) I POINTED OUT THAT US WAS IN BEST POSITION TO DEAL WITH ARAB PRESSURES AND, IN CONSEQUENCE, US POSITION WAS COMPARATIVELY UNSELFISH IN TRYING TO ORGANIZE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS. HE ARGUED THAT PROBLEM WAS NOT BASICALLY ONE OF ENERGY. ENERGY PROBLEMS, HE ASSERTED, COULD BE SOLVED IN VARIOUS WAYS. I ASKED WHETHER HE CONSIDERED UN COULD DEAL WITH PROBLEM, INDICATING MY DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE. GULDBERG SAID THAT WEST COULD PERHAPS WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WITH OPEC, IN EFFECT PROVIDING FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO CARTELS. ABOVE ALL, HE SAID, WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID GOING IN DIRECTIONS WHICH ARE AT CROSS PURPOSES

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WITH THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE.

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TRSE-00 CEA-01 DRC-01 (ISO) W

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 0463

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REF: COPENHAGEN 438, 448

6. GULDBERG COMMENTED THAT ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO WORK OUT BILATERAL OIL DEALS WITH ARABS. DURING ONE MEETING OF NINE IN WASHINGTON, HE RELATED, JOBERT LOOKED AROUND TABLE AND SAID THAT IN COURSE OF HIS RECENT TRIP TO MID EAST HE HAD ENCOUNTERED OF HIS COLLEAGUES. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT CONSUMERS WOULD HAVE GREATER BARGAINING

POWER WITH ARABS IF THEY STUCK TOGETHER, GULDBERG AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT SAID "WE NEED OIL BY MARCH 15". HE CONTINUED THAT DANES HADN'T REALLY THOUGHT WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WOULD SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. DANES IMPORT 100 PERCENT OF THEIR OIL FROM ABOARD, IN CONTRAST TO US 15 PER CENT, HE OBSERVED. "WE ONLY HAVE RESERVES FOR NEXT SEVEN TO EIGHT WEEKS". HE ADDED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S OFFER TO SHARE ENERGY WAS OK FOR NEXT CRISIS, NOT NOW. JAPANESE APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL EUROPEAN RELUCTANCE TO BE BOUND TOO TIGHTLY BY RESULTS OF CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH HE DIDN'T SAY MUCH. FOR DENMARK, HE SAID THE BIG DANGER IS SIMPLY THAT OF BEING FORGOTTEN IN THE SCRAMBLE.

7. GULDBERG SAID NEXT MOVE IN SCENARIO WAS FOR COORDINATING COMMITTEE, SET UP BY CONFERENCE, TO TRY TO IMPLEMENT COMMUNIQUE. THEY WILL LOOK INTO POSSIBILITY OF HAVING ANOTHER CONFERENCE OF CONSUMERS PRIOR TO ANTICIPATED CONFERENCE BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS. HE SAID HE TOLD SECRETARY AND SCHEEL IN WASHINGTON TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF HOLDING PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE ITSELF. IN HIS OPINION, IF SUCH A MEETING TURNED OUT LIKE JUST CONCLUDED CONFERENCE, RESULTS WOULD BE DISASTROUS. HE ASSUMES THAT USG WILL TAKE INITIATIVE IN CONVENING FURTHER CONFERENCES, BUT THAT ONE SHOULD TRY TO ESTABLISH IN ADVANCE WHETHER FRANCE WILL REFUSE TO BE REPRESENTED, EVEN AT OFFICIAL

LEVEL. SOME DAY FRENCH WILL HAVE TO GO ALONG, BUT THEY NEED TO BE HANDLED CAREFULLY. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER PRODUCERS THEMSELVES MIGHT NOT WANT JOINT MEETING WITH CONSUMERS, HE REPLIED, "YES, BUT ONLY WHEN MID EAST PEACE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. ONCE THAT IS DONE, ALL OTHER PROBLEMS BECOME SOLVABLE".

8. GULDBERG ADMITTED THAT MANY EUROPEANS ARE FRUSTRATED BY FRENCH BEHAVIOR AND THAT THIS IS NOT UNEXPECTED. AS EXAMPLE OF FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND FRENCH ATTITUDE, HE CITED PRE-CONFERENCE
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DINNER HOSTED BY FRG, TO WHICH FRENCH ALONE WERE NOT INVITED. JOBERT WAS LAST TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON, ABOUT 10:00 P.M. AND THEN HAD APPOINTMENT TO MEET SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE DINNER. ALTHOUGH JOBERT WOULD HAVE BEEN INVITED IF HE WERE AVAILABLE AND GERMANS DID NOT HOLD DINNER DELIBERATELY ON THAT EVENING BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT BE PRESENT, FRENCH HAD RESENTED IT. REFERRING TO HIS EARLIER COMMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT EC COUNTRIES COULD HAVE DEPARTED FROM COMMON MANDATE BUT NEEDED TO TALK ABOUT IT FIRST. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ALL RIGHT FOR FRENCH TO STAND ON THEIR POINT, WHILE OTHERS SHOWED MORE FLEXIBILITY. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, ONE MUST TAKE COMFORT FROM THOUGHT THAT GOOD SOMETIMES COMES FROM BAD SO THAT CONFERENCE MAY PRODUCE SOME HELPFUL DEVELOPMENTS.

9. I NOTED THAT GULDBERG HAD ACQUIRED REPUTATION OF BEING PRO-

FRENCH, ALTHOUGH I DIDNT THINK HE WAS. HE REPLIED, DEFENSIVELY, THAT HE THOUGHT HE KNEW THE FRENCH MIND AND TRIED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH JOBERT EVEN WHEN HE DISAGREED, AS HE DID ON CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT EUROPEANS FREQUENTLY TRY TO FIND A SCAPEGOAT WHEN THINGS GO WRONG AND CURRENTLY THIS IS FRANCE. HE PRAISED FRENCH, HOWEVER, FOR THEIR SENSE OF LOGIC AND ASSERTED THAT THEY ARE ONE OF FEW EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH CAN HAVE A POLICY OF ITS OWN.

10. IN MORE GENERAL VEIN, GULDBERG OBSERVED THAT DENMARK IS IN A MOST UNCOMFORTABLE GEORGRAPHIC POSITION WHEN BIG POWERS START FIGHTING. DANES THEREFORE WANT TO STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EVENTUALLY BRINGING IN OTHER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. THAT IS WHY DISAGREEMENT WHICH SURFACED IN WASHINGTON IS SO DISQUIETING FOR DENMARK. IF EC SHOULD DISAPPEAR, DANES WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO NORTH AND EAST FOR THE TRADE ON WHICH THEIR LIVELIHOOD DEPENDS. AS A COUNTRY OF ONLY FIVE MILLION PEOPLE, HE SAID, DENMARK CAN NOT AFFORD TO DISAGREE TOO OPENLY WITH THE GREAT POWERS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, PETROLEUM, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974COPENH00463
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: COPENHAGEN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740230/aaaabbvn.tel
Line Count: 296
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: COPENHAGEN 438, 448
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <03 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FOREIGN MINISTER GULDBERG TELLS AMBASSADOR HOW HE REALLY FEELS ABOUT ENERGY CONFERENCE
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To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005